<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><!DOCTYPE article  PUBLIC '-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.4//EN'  'http://www.docbook.org/xml/4.4/docbookx.dtd'><article><articleinfo><title>HeartBleedAfterMath</title><revhistory><revision><revnumber>8</revnumber><date>2014-04-19 00:32:33</date><authorinitials>ClintonEbadi</authorinitials><revremark>we can maybe buy a wildcard cert from gandi</revremark></revision><revision><revnumber>7</revnumber><date>2014-04-18 17:13:33</date><authorinitials>ClintonEbadi</authorinitials><revremark>navajos is less bad than it seems, deleuze is really as bad as it seems</revremark></revision><revision><revnumber>6</revnumber><date>2014-04-18 17:12:12</date><authorinitials>ClintonEbadi</authorinitials><revremark>turned sslv2 off on deleuze</revremark></revision><revision><revnumber>5</revnumber><date>2014-04-18 13:55:55</date><authorinitials>Sajith</authorinitials></revision><revision><revnumber>4</revnumber><date>2014-04-18 13:53:23</date><authorinitials>Sajith</authorinitials></revision><revision><revnumber>3</revnumber><date>2014-04-18 13:46:47</date><authorinitials>Sajith</authorinitials></revision><revision><revnumber>2</revnumber><date>2014-04-18 13:40:24</date><authorinitials>Sajith</authorinitials></revision><revision><revnumber>1</revnumber><date>2014-04-18 13:33:20</date><authorinitials>Sajith</authorinitials></revision></revhistory></articleinfo><section><title>Heartbleed Aftermath</title><para>Fortunately HCoop wasn't hit by the OpenSSL <ulink url="http://heartbleed.com/">Heartbleed</ulink> bug.  However this perhaps is an opportunity for some spring clean up. </para><para>These reports do not look good: </para><itemizedlist><listitem><para><ulink url="https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=navajos.hcoop.net">SSL Report: navajos.hcoop.net</ulink> </para></listitem><listitem><para><ulink url="https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=deleuze.hcoop.net">SSL Report: deleuze.hcoop.net</ulink> </para></listitem></itemizedlist><para>(Warning: their analyzer may need to run, and you might need to wait a while to see the actual report.) </para><para>Here's the status of navajos: it gets an F per the above SSL Labs report, because: </para><itemizedlist><listitem><para>Server's certificate is not trusted. Grade set to F. Ignoring certificate problems, it gets a C. </para></listitem><listitem><para>Server supports only older protocols, but not the current best TLS 1.2. Grade capped to B.  </para></listitem><listitem><para>Server does not support Forward Secrecy with the reference browsers. </para></listitem></itemizedlist><para>Deleuze is particularly problematic, because: </para><itemizedlist><listitem><para>Server's certificate is not trusted. Grade set to F. Ignoring certificate problems, it still gets an F. </para></listitem><listitem><para><emphasis role="strikethrough">Server supports SSL 2, which is obsolete and insecure. Grade set to F.--) <emphasis>Fixed</emphasis>   </emphasis><listitem><para>Server is vulnerable to MITM attacks because it supports insecure renegotiation. Grade set to F. </para></listitem><listitem><para>Server does not mitigate the CRIME attack. Grade capped to B. </para></listitem><listitem><para>Server supports only older protocols, but not the current best TLS 1.2. Grade capped to B. </para></listitem><listitem><para>There is no support for secure renegotiation. </para></listitem><listitem><para>Server does not support Forward Secrecy with the reference browsers.   </para></listitem></para><para>Since deleuze is scheduled to be decommissioned, we might want to focus on the remaining problems. </para><section><title>CA Certification</title><para>Problem: Browsers do not trust HCoop's self-signed certificate. Potential members might be scared away by big honking browser warnings.  We might want to get a &quot;proper&quot; CA-signed certificate; perhaps a wildcard one.  But these tend to be fairly expensive. </para><para>These are the choices at the moment, to solve the immediate problem in an inexpensive manner: </para><itemizedlist><listitem><para><ulink url="https://www.gandi.net/">Gandi</ulink> offers one-year free CA certificate with domain registrations. </para></listitem><listitem><para><ulink url="https://startssl.com/">StartSSL</ulink> offers free CA certificates, but charges $25 for revocations. </para></listitem></itemizedlist><para>HCoop has plenty of funds on hand, opening up two other options </para><itemizedlist><listitem><para>Gandi Standard Wildcard Cert </para><itemizedlist><listitem><para>$160/year for <code>*.hcoop.net</code> and <code>hcoop.net</code> </para></listitem><listitem><para>Automatic domain verification, i.e. we can acquire and start installing it to the appropriate machines within a few days </para></listitem><listitem><para><ulink url="https://wiki.hcoop.net/HeartBleedAfterMath/ClintonEbadi#">ClintonEbadi</ulink> confirmed with Gandi support that we are OK having member subdomains and using a wildcard certificate from them </para></listitem><listitem><para>Disadvantages: No organizational information is attached to the cert, one cert that must be secured on multiple machines </para></listitem></itemizedlist></listitem><listitem><para>StartSSL Class 2 Organizational Certification </para><itemizedlist><listitem><para>$60 for a &quot;certmaster&quot; to be personally verified, and another $60 for HCoop itself to be verified, per year </para></listitem><listitem><para>Certificates provide organization information (but not extended validation) </para></listitem><listitem><para>You can issue unlimited certificates, allowing us to use multiple private keys (slight security improvement) </para></listitem><listitem><para>Disadvantages: organizational validation will take weeks (we have to request documentation from the State of PA), a certmaster must be appointed, revocations cost money (but we're unlikely to lose certs...) </para></listitem></itemizedlist></listitem></itemizedlist><para><ulink url="https://wiki.hcoop.net/HeartBleedAfterMath/ClintonEbadi#">ClintonEbadi</ulink> thinks that a Gandi wildcard certificate makes the most sense right now (easier, and providing organization information in a cert is of dubious value). </para></section><section><title>Perfect Forward Secrecy</title><para><ulink url="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy">Forward Secrecy</ulink> is being advocated as a solution that offers stronger protection for private keys; evidently it is  <ulink url="https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/mod_ssl.html#sslciphersuite">straightforward to enable with Apache</ulink>. </para><para>See <ulink url="https://bugzilla.hcoop.net/show_bug.cgi?id=1113">ticket #113</ulink>. </para></section></listitem></itemizedlist></section></article>